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 1. Introduction 
The evidence of long-term stock return reversals has been found across a wide range of 
developed and developing markets (Antoniou et al., 2005; Bhojraj and Swaminathan, 2006; 
Chou et al., 2007; Dissanaike and Lim, 2010; Gupta et al. 2010, McInish et al., 2008; Nam et al. 
2003; Wongchoti and Pyun, 2005). While the outperformance of loser stocks relative to winner 
stocks is generally accepted, indentifying causes of return reversals has been more controversial.  
Since the seminal findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) invoke psychological evidence to motivate a price 
overreaction hypothesis in line with a general prediction of the behavioural decision theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982). In contrast to the behavioural view of over-reaction, Klein (1999; 
2001), George and Hwang (2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) contend that the effect of 
losers outperforming winners is attributable to investor rational behaviour such as strategic tax-
avoidance incentives. Lewellen and Shanken (2002) and Brav and Heaton (2002) provide 
Bayesians learning models to support rational explanations for long-term reversals. In their 
models, investors put too much weight on extreme observations that may generate over-reaction 
in beliefs to good and bad news. Reversals occur when investors learn that they over-reacted in 
the past. Fama and French (1993; 1996) contend that the long-term winner-loser effect is within 
the value-growth paradigm, reflecting that losers are riskier than winners in terms of distress 
costs. Consistent with this, Fama and French (1995) show that a high book-to-market equity ratio 
as a proxy for high distress costs predicts poor future earnings. Fama (1998), Fama and French 
(2006) and La Porta (1996) claim that long-term contrarian performance is the result of a mis-
measured relationship between risk and return
1
. However, Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that 
value stocks outperform growth stocks because of investors over-estimating future growth rates 
of growth stocks relative to value stocks. Lakonishok et al. (1994) contend that the value 
premium is a mispricing effect rather than a risk measure in Fama and French (1993, 1996).  
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 Zhang (2005) provides theoretical models to support this view. Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova (2006) also 
support the view that the HML factor (the value factor) is a potential proxy for business cycle and should be priced 




To summarize, there are three competing explanations for long-term return reversals.
2
 The 
behavioural explanations are centred on whether over-reaction to past performance contributes to 
return reversals. One of the rational explanations attributes reversals to tax-avoidance incentives, 
while it is still controversial whether stock value and growth features reflect risk or mispricing.  
This paper seeks to test these three competing explanations by using data of 1673 stocks listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1974 to 2009. By using past performance based winners 
and losers as benchmark portfolios, the value-growth hypothesis expects that firm specific 
features should have stronger power than past performance in predicting returns. Three variables 
are employed as proxies for firm value-growth features, namely book-to-market, cash-flow-to-
price, and earnings-to-price. The capital gain lock-in hypothesis is built upon the idea that winner 
reversals are due to investor incentives to delay paying capital gain taxes and winners identified 
by capital gains should predict reversals other than past performance winner
3
. Taxation is one of 
the most prevalent market frictions in financial markets, affecting investment decisions and 
distorting the valuation of assets (Constantinides, 1984). However, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between tax and asset price is predominantly limited in the U.S. The UK is also a 
country with legal settings on capital gain taxes and one of our purposes is to test whether capital 
gain taxes can ultimately affect long run asset prices in a similar pattern as those documented in 
the U.S. To our best knowledge, the capital gain lock-in hypothesis to explain long-term 
reversals have not been examined in the UK context.  
Previous studies on long-term reversals mainly focus on the profitability of contrarian strategies 
in which value and growth features associated with winners and losers are obtained from the 
factors loadings on the relevant asset pricing models (e.g. the CAPM and the Fama-French 
model). We pair-wisely compare returns on portfolios which are formulated on past performance, 
tax incentives and firm specific value-growth features, in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions 
on a head-to-head basis. This approach is different from those customarily adopted in the 
literature. 
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 Conrad et al. (2003) and Conard and Kaul (1993) suggest that evidence of long-term reversals may be a 
consequence of data snooping. 
3
Similarly, loser reversals are caused by tax-loss selling at tax year ends, and this is strongly linked with the calendar 
effect. However, this paper mainly investigates the capital gain lock-in hypothesis.  
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To pre-empt our results, we find that firm value-growth features generally provide better 
explanations for cross-sectional stock returns than past performance in the long term.  The 
predictability of value-growth features is relatively strong when we use book-to-market equity 
ratio as a proxy for value-growth features. Our striking results are from the comparison between 
past performance and capital gain measures. In the cross-sectional analysis, we find that winners 
identified by a large amount of capital gains completely dominate past performance winners in 
predicting reversals. In the time-series analysis, the predictive power of capital winners cannot 
be fully explained away by using the market and the two-factor (market and size) model.  
However, inconsistent with the findings in the U.S. (George and Hwang, 2007), the predictive 
power of capital gain winners becomes disappeared in the three-factor model (FF) (Fama and 
French, 1993; 1996). Our results show that capital gain winners are heavily featured as growth 
stocks, which are more likely to be overvalued than value stocks. The evidence suggests that the 
reversals in stocks with large amounts of capital gains potentially reflect market price corrections 
for growth stocks. Therefore, we conclude that incentives to delay paying capital gain taxes are 
less likely to explain long-term reversals in the UK context. This paper empirically tests both the 
typical rational incentives based on deferral tax payments and the classical past performance 
based behavioural explanations for long-term return reversals. The results suggest that neither of 
them win this game. Overall, we conjecture that the pattern of return reversals potentially reflect 
a mixture of investor rational and irrational behaviour.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. The hypotheses are 
developed in section 3, while section 4 outlines the sample and the methodology. Section 5 
reports the empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides conclusions and implications of the 
paper.    
2. Literature Review 
Since the seminal finding of DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) that past losers outperform past 
winners over 3 to 5 years, considerable academic effort has sought to explain this winner-loser 
effect. Early research argues that time-varying beta risk explains this return reversal pattern 
(Chan, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989; Jones, 1993). However, Lee and Swaninathan (2000) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) contend that the contrarian strategy by buying losers and selling 
5 
 
winners offers superior risk-adjusted performance. Outside the conventional risk-return paradigm, 
Daniel et al. (1998) attribute long-term and short-term return anomalies to investor 
overconfidence and self-attribution, while Barberis et al. (1998) introduce psychological 
concepts of “the representativeness heuristic” and “the conservatism bias” which investors 
inherently experience when interpreting new information. The two behaviour models indicate 
that investor initial underreaction to news causes momentum. When investors correct their priors, 
they will experience overreaction in the long term. In the behavioural view, under-reaction in the 
short run and over-reaction in the long run are more likely to be an integral process by which the 
market absorbs new information. The evidence of return momentum in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and reversals in the long run (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001) is consistent with this 
contention. However, George and Hwang (2004) find that there is no direct link between 
momentum and reversals, since momentum captured by the relative price to 52-week high price 
has no long-term reversals
4
.     
 
In terms of rational explanations of return reversals, Constantinides (1984) first develops the tax 
timing option model for the abnormal January returns. In his model, investors should realize 
capital losses as soon as they occur; since capital losses can offset future realized capital gains. 
In contrast to capital loss, Kleim (1999; 2001) models that investors should have great incentives 
to delay realising embedded capital gains, unless buyers can offer a higher price to compensate 
sellers for some costs of capital gain taxes. When stocks are eventually sold to buyers without 
any embedded capital gains, prices of those stocks will go down, leading to winner reversals. 
The two tax-based models predict that stock returns should exhibit reversals in the long term, if 
investors take into account of potential capital gain tax payment. Shackelford and Verrecchia 
(2002) develop a trading model in which rates of capital gain tax create a trade-off between 
optimal risk-sharing and optimal tax related trading. They show that sellers are reluctant to sell 
appreciated assets sooner because they are subject to higher capital gains taxes. In order to 
acquire stocks, buyers must provide compensation in the form of higher sales prices to sellers. 
On the empirical side, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find no reversals for consistent winners 
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 However, Gupta et al. (2010) investigate the 52-week high measures in international stock markets of 51 countries 
and find that momentum profits also exhibit reversals after the first 12 months holding period.    
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(identified as the cumulative return from months t-36 to t-13), while consistent losers have no 
significant reversals outside January, suggesting that reversals are caused by tax-loss selling 
consistent losers at tax year ends. In a similar spirit, George and Hwang (2007) provide empirical 
evidence in support of the model of Kleim (1999) with the role of capital gains in reversals. They 
find that losers reverse their returns only in January, while winner reversals are attributable to 
investor incentives to delay paying capital gain tax. Therefore, the evidence in U.S supports tax-
motivated explanations for reversals.
5
    
 
Since Fama and French (1993) develop the three-factor model, the debate on the long-term 
return anomaly shifts to firm value-growth characteristics (e.g. book-to-market ratio, cash-flow 
to price ratio, and earnings to price ratio). While stocks with a high book-to-market ratio possibly 
signals a high distress cost, losers should have a high expected return relative to winners that 
have on average a low distress cost. Consistent with this, Fama and French (1995) show that high 
book-to-market equity ratio predicts poor future earnings. Zhang (2005) ’s theoretical model 
supports Fama and French’s conclusions providing an analytical framework in which value 
stocks additional riskiness emanates from their inability to scale down capital investment during 
market downturns. By using indexes to rank firms by default probability or intensity of distress, 
Garlappi et al. (2008) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) confirm the findings of Fama and 
French (1995) and Zhang (2005) that distress costs do predict defaults for individual firms and 
they are larger during recessions. The above authors support that the value premium potentially 
represents risk. However, Ang and Chen (2007) challenge the risk argument of the value 
premium and they find that the CAPM captures the value premium during 1926-1963 in the U.S. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Daniel and Titman (1997) conclude that value out-performs growth 
and that this finding may be explained by market participants’ consistently over-estimating 
future growth rates of growth stocks relative to value stocks and that the return to value investing 
is no riskier than growth strategies.  
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 Dai et al. (2008) find that investors require higher prices to sell stocks after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 in the 
U.S. This evidence is consistent with the capital gain lock-in effect. Jin (2006) investigates whether the capital gain 
tax is an impediment to selling and he finds that selling decisions are negatively influenced by an amount of 
cumulative capital gains for institutional investors, who have a large number of tax-sensitive clients. 
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Most studies of the UK market have extensively analysed long-term contrarian investment 
strategies, but main sources of long-term contrarian performance are not agreed. Clare and 
Thomas (1995) first investigate long-term reversals for a sample of 1000 UK stocks from 1955 
to 1990. They support the over-reaction hypothesis and attribute their findings to a size effect. 
However, Dissanaike (1999) finds reversals are not driven by a size effect for a sample of FTSE 
500 firms from 1975-1991. Galariotis et al. (2007) provide evidence supporting profitable 
contrarian investment strategies for the London Stock Exchange (LSE) listed stocks from 1964 to 
2005. They conclude that the Fama-French (1993) model accounts for all contrarian profits. 
Regarding to the value-growth features, Li et al. (2009) analyze the value premium and find that 
high return volatility is one of possible causes for the superior performance of value stocks in the 
UK from the 1963 to 2006 period. Recently, Dissanaike and Lim, (2010) investigate contrarian 
strategies by incorporating the accounting information based upon the Ohlson (1995) and the 
residual income model. They find that the accounting information based contrarian strategies 
cannot outperform the BM (book-to-market) based contrarian strategies.  
 
So far there is no consensus on causes of long-term return reversals, are long-term reversals 
driven by past performance (e.g. losers and winners), firm value-growth characteristics, or 
investor tax incentives? This paper empirically answers this question. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
To investigate the three competing explanations, we formulate the value-growth hypothesis and 
the capital gain lock-in hypothesis, while the null hypothesis that past performance predicts 
return reversals is set as the benchmark explanation. We make two comparisons, (i) past 
performance against value-growth and (ii) past performance against capital gains.  
3.1 Value-growth hypothesis  
Value investing is an important strategy to exploit current out of favour stocks with market 
participants. Value investors believe that the book value of a firm’s equity is a useful barometer 
of intrinsic value. High book-to-market (value) stocks are likely to be undervalued, while low 
book-to-market (growth) stocks are likely to be overvalued. Consistent with this, Fama and 
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French (1992, 1993) confirm that high book-to-market (henceforth BM) earn significantly higher 
average returns than low BM stocks in the U.S stock markets. In relation to long-term reversals, 
the findings of Fama and French (1996) show that the Fama-French (1993) factors explain the 1-
month-ahead returns of long-term (5 years) winners and losers. The factor loadings in the FF 
model indicate that winners (losers) are more likely to be growth (value) stocks. Fama and 
French (2006) claim that the return premium to value stocks potentially represents compensation 
for another dimension of systematic risk in addition to beta. Our first hypothesis, the value-
growth hypothesis, is built upon the simple idea that the value-growth strategy should be more 
powerful in predicting returns than the winner-loser strategy. We expect that losers and winners 
gain insignificant returns. 
3.2 Capital gain lock-in hypothesis 
The tax related explanations for reversals is modelled on the ground that general tax law settings 
have limited abilities to recognize capital loss. If an investor incurs any capital loss in previous 
tax-year, the amount of loss has a “carry-over” feature which can offset current or future capital 
gains. In the U.S markets, losers have significantly positive returns in January. This evidence is 
consistent with the notion that investors exploit losers to establish tax-loss positions at the tax 
year end.  The logic for winner reversals is built upon the idea that capital gain taxes are paid 
only when gains are realised. Investors will only sell winner stocks with a large embedded gain 
when prices can compensate them to forgo the value of delaying payment of tax. When winners 
are eventually sold to buyers without large embedded gains, the marginal investor’s reservation 
prices fall. This process leads to winner reversals. The capital gain lock-in hypothesis claims that 
stocks with a large amount of capital gains should reverse their returns in the long term. George 
and Hwang (2007) is the first to test this hypothesis in the contexts of the U.S and the Hong 
Kong markets. They find that embedded capital gains are responsible for winner reversals in the 
U.S but not in Hong Kong. The latter market has no legal settings of capital gain taxes. We 
follow George and Hwang (2007) to build upon capital gain measures and to see whether these 
measures have any dominant predictive power over winners identified by past performance.  




The sample of stocks is based on the constituents of the FTSE-All Share Index in the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) from June 1974-December 2009. Monthly prices and firm characteristics 
(MV, BM, CF/P and E/P) of each stock are extracted from the Thomson Datastream (TD). Since 
the TD may contain incorrect data information (Ince and Porter, 2006), we undertake three clean-
up procedures for the dataset to ensure the validity and consistency of the sample dataset. This 
practice is in line with Ince and Porter (2006).  First, the TD records the most recent price for the 
full time series if a stock is delisted during the sample period. To eliminate this dummy record, 
we re-code the monthly return series as missing values from the end of the sample period back to 
the first nonzero return
6
. Second, Ince and Porter (2006) find that the TD includes stocks which 
are not listed on the LSE. We search for the stock exchange in which a stock is listed and 
exclude those which are not listed in the LSE. In addition, we screen all constituent stocks and 
exclude those whose quoted prices are not denominated in the British Sterling. Finally, we 
exclude unit trusts, close-end, and open-end funds in the sample
7
.  Our sample dataset contains 
1673 sample stocks and 332,220 firm-month observations. If a stock has less than 60-month 
price information, this stock is also excluded from analysis. The dataset is unbalanced in each 
calendar month, meaning that the number of observations varies when we run calendar time 
based Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. With a 60-month test period, the first cross-sectional 
regression starts from June 1979, while the last regression ends in December 2009.  
4.2 Variables Description 
                                                          
6
 Additionally, we use a variable TIME provided by the TD to find the date of last equity price data for delisted 
stocks. However, we find that the value of TIME is not informative for delisted stocks. For example, the value of 
TIME is “#NA” for the Manchester United Football Club, which was delisted in May 2005. This procedure to 
record the return series as missing values is the same as that used by Ince and Porter (2006).    
7
 Since these stocks have no information on book value per share or earnings per share in the TD, they can be easily 
identified in the dataset.    
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(i) Past performance measure (5year winner or loser
8
): this measure is simply the stock’s return 









( )60...3,2,1j . The subscript j is the number 
of rolling back windows. The subscript t denotes month t.  
(ii)  Value-growth characteristics: we use three firm ratios to capture value-growth features. BM 
is the book to market ratio defined as book value equity (BV) divided by market value equity 
(MV). Following Fama and French (2006), we record BM as a missing value if it is negative. 
CF/P is a cash flow to price ratio defined as operational cash flows divided by price. E/P is an 
earning price ratio defined as earnings divided by price. The numerators of the three ratios, BV, 
CF, and E, are fiscal year ending values in the preceding calendar month t-j. The denominators 
of the three ratios, MV and P, are values in month t-j.  
(iii) Capital gain measures: we follow George and Hwang (2007) to formulate two measures for 
capital gains. 
(a) Five-Year Low Measure (FYL): this measure gives the nearness of the month t-j price 

























FYL  (j=1, 2, 3, … 60)    (1) 
where wt-j-n is a dummy variable with a value of one if Pt-j-n=min {Pt-j , Pt-j-1 ,…, Pt-j-60} 
and zero otherwise. FYL is a measure of embedded capital gains under the extreme 
assumption that stocks are bought at the 5-year lowest. With ex post, FYL measures the 
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 In the literature of long-term return reversals, documented abnormal returns seem to be less sensitive to the length 
of portfolio formation period. DeBond and Thaler (1985) find the contrarian performance is 31.9% over the 5-year 
period (0.53% per month) according to the past 5-year return sorting and is 24.6% over the 3-year period (0.68% per 
month) according to the past 3-year return sorting. In the unreported table, we calculate the correlations between 
winners and losers according to different portfolio formation periods (e.g. 3-year and 4-year). 5-year winner 
correlates more with 4-year winner and relatively less with 3-year winner, specifically, 0.72 for the former and 0.58 
for the latter. There is a similar correlation pattern for losers. The correlation matrix shows that even though we use 
different time horizons to define winners or losers, there is a great magnitude of similarity in past performance. For 




maximum potential capital gains. The capital lock-in hypothesis therefore predicts that 
stocks identified as winners based on a ranking by FYL will experience negative excess 
returns.  
(b) Equal-weighted gain only measure (EWGO): This measure equals to   
(2) 
   
where njtw  is a dummy variable with a value of one if Pt-j >Pt-j-n and wt-n=0 otherwise. 
This measure recognises capital gains only during the past 60 months, while it also 
assumes that capital losses cannot generate potential benefits of deferral capital gain tax 
payments. According to the capital lock-in hypothesis, winners identified by this measure 
should exhibit stronger reversals than past performance winners. However, losers 
classified by this measure indicate that they have a less amount of capital gains and, 
therefore, should have no reversals.   
(iv) Momentum controls (the 52 Week high price):  To control for the momentum effect, we use 
dummies of 52wkhWi,t-j and 52wkhLi,t-j which are the highest and lowest price levels in the 52 










ranked among the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Here, Pi,t-j is 
the price stock i at the end of month t-j and highi,t-j  is the highest month-end price of stock i 
during the 12-month period that ends on the last day of the month t-j . George and Hwang (2004) 
find the 52-week high measure is more able to capture short-term momentum than the past 
performance measure based on the fixed (e.g. 6-month returns) window used by Jagadeesh and 
Titman (1993)
9
. Furthermore, George and Hwang claim that the 52-week high measure is not 
subject to long-term reversals. 
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 In addition, George and Hwang (2004) find that the 52-week high measure is superior to Moskowitz and Grinblatt 





























Our ranking rule follows George and Hwang (2004, 2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) 
with a 30% cutoff rate for each variable. We set two dummies for past performance. 5year loser 
(winner) equal 1 if a stock’s past performance is in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks at month t-
j and zero otherwise. There are also four dummies for each capital gain measure, for example, 
EWGO winner, EWGO loser, FYL winner and FYL loser. EWGO (FYL) winner (loser) equals 1 if 
a stock is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of stocks in terms of EWGO (FYL) at month t-j.and 
zero otherwise. The same settings are applied to firm ratio variables, BM, CP/P and E/P. For 
example, HBM (LBM) equals 1 if a stock is ranked the top 30% of all stocks in terms of BM at 
month t-j. 
4.3 Empirical model 
We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to estimate abnormal returns for each 
portfolio. If an investor forms portfolios of winners and losers every month and hold these 
portfolios for the next T months, the return earned in a given month t is the equal-weighted 
average of the returns to T portfolios, each formed in one of the past T months t-j (for j=1,...,T 
and T=1,.. 60). The denotation j is a subscript of the number of rolling back months. The 
contribution of the portfolio formed in month t-j to the month t return can be obtained by 













                             (3) 
where Rit is the return to stock i in month t. Sizei,t-1 is market capitalisation in a logarithm form 
for stock i and at month t-1. Ri,t-1 is stock i’s return at month t-1 . Both Sizei,t-1 and  Ri,t-1  are 
included in the regression as deviations from cross sectional means at month t-1. The intercept 
b0jt is the risk neutral portfolio’s return which has been taken out by the effects of average size, 
bid-ask bounce, and momentum. We run this regression 60 times (j=1,2,…60) for each calendar 
month t from June 1979 to December 2009.  The averaged return for 5-year winners over the 60-





bS .Then, the time series 
mean, 
5S , is an excess return for past winners relative to stocks which are neither winners nor 
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losers.  The coefficients on other variables can be computed and interpreted in a same way. The 
time series means (
5S ) of the month-by-month estimates and their t-statistics are reported in the 
tables. The 60-month observation window is typically used in the literature of long-term stock 
return analysis (Fama and French, 1996; George and Hwang, 2007). The documented short-term 
anomaly such as momentum also tends to be reversed in the 5-year period (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 2001). Furthermore, by using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, we examine 
abnormal returns not only across the overall 5-year averaged return but also the return in each 
sub-interval (e.g. the first, second, third until the fifth year) time period. 



















    (4) 
In Eq (4), HBM and LBM are stocks within the top and bottom 30% of BM in all stocks at month 
t-j. According to the value-growth hypothesis, 7b and 8b should be respectively positive and 
negative. More importantly, if value-growth characteristics can fully explain long-term returns, 
past performance should have no power in predicting returns, suggesting that 5b and 6b  are 
statistically near to zero. To test the capital gain lock-in hypothesis, we replace the variables of 
HBM and LBM in Eq(4) with EWGO winner and loser. If capital gain measures can rationalise 
reversals, we should observe that EWGO winners have significant negative returns. However, 
returns 5-year winners ( 5b ) become insignificantly different from zero.  
Risk-adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio in Eq (4) are obtained by using the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model over the holding period. Specifically, the time series of tS5 , 
tS6 , tS7 , and tS8  are individually regressed on the Fama-French (1993) three factors. The 
intercepts (alphas) of the regressions are risk-adjusted abnormal returns for 5-year winner, 5-year 
loser, high BM (EWGOWinner), and low BM (EWGOLoser) portfolio.  The four portfolios in Eq 
(4) are associated with two competing long-term investment strategies, for example, past 
performance against capital gains, or past performance against BM. To examine the joint 
14 
 
significance of returns on the four portfolios, we employ the GRS statistical test developed by 
Gibbsons et al. (1989) with the null hypothesis that risk-adjusted abnormal returns on the four 
portfolios are jointly equal zero
10
.   
The Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology is widely used in the empirical finance literature, 
however it does not take account of serial correlation across time in the residuals for a given firm, 
the firm effect (see, for instance as highlighted by Petersen, 2009), which will generate biased 
standard errors. Petersen (2009), Cameron et al. (2006) and Thompson (2010) suggest using 
clustered standard errors controlled in two dimensions: time-series and cross-section. However, 
as noted by Thompson (2010), the method of clustered standard error works well when the 
number of firms and time periods is not too different. If there are far more firms than time 
periods, clustering by time eliminates most of the bias unless within-firm correlations are much 
larger than with-in time period correlation. Moreover, in this case, double clustering generates 
probably less biased, but much noisier standard errors. In our dataset, we have 366 months and 
700-800 firms in each month. We implement the method of clustered standard errors and find 
that the results are not significantly different from those used by the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
method. Moreover, in the context of this paper, the clustered standard error procedure cannot be 
used to generate risk-adjusted returns. While month-by-month abnormal returns calculated by the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) method for each portfolio are regressed on the time-series Fama-French 
(FF) three factor model, month-by-month abnormal returns are not obtainable by the clustered 
standard error method, which is one single pooled regression. Consequently, we choose in this 
paper to utilise the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology
11
.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Simple correlations 
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 The GRS test is basically an F-statistics test on risk-adjusted returns of portfolios. Fama and French (2006) also 
use the GRS test to evaluate whether the value premium varies with firm size.  
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Table 1 reports a correlation matrix for the 14 variables which are calculated as time-series 
averages of cross-section correlations. We find that 5-year winners have a positive correlation 
(0.11) with 52 week high winners and a negative one (-0.11) with 52 week high losers. This fact 
gives a further justification to control for momentum which can potentially offset long-term 
return reversals especially in the first year after portfolio formation. The correlation between 
EWGO winner and low-BM is almost in a same magnitude as that between 5-year winner and 
low-BM (0.27 against 0.24). Furthermore, regardless of past performance and embedded gain 
measures, winners have higher (lower) correlations with low (high)-BM, CF/P and E/P than 
losers. This may imply that winners share some similar features, even though we have defined 
them in a different way.   
5.1 Past performance winners and loser 
We first estimate average returns for 5-year winners and losers by running the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions in each calendar month from 1979-2009. The time-series averages for each 
coefficient are reported in Table 2. Following Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and George and 
Hwang (2007), we report estimates both including and excluding January and April. This method 
reflects the tax setting that the UK personal tax year ends in March
12
. Column (11) and (12) 
show returns related to the entire 5-year holding period, while other columns report returns over 
subintervals of the 5-year period. The last row gives averaged observations which are included to 
run cross-sectional regressions in each calendar month.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In column (11) and (12), 5-year winners have a significantly negative return of -0.10% outside 
January and April, while 5-year losers earn a significantly positive return of 0.12% over a 5-year 
horizon. The magnitude of contrarian performance, measured by the return on losers minus 
winners, is around 0.21% per month or 2.52% per annum. In each subinterval year, losers begin 
to have a positive return of 0.15% in the first year after portfolio formation. The tendency of 
losers’ positive returns ends in the fourth year (column (7) and (8)). Winners start to have a 
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 Draper and Paudyal (2007) show that 35% of their 1763 sample of UK companies during 1994 had a December 
year-end and 21% had a March year-end.  
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negative return of -0.10% in the second year (column (3)). The magnitude of winner reversals in 
each subinterval year is highly persistent with a range from -0.10% to -0.06% per month. Loser 
returns outside January and April are similar to those including all calendar months except the 
window of (1, 12) with an insignificant return of 0.07% per month. In other windows including 
the entire 5-year window, the difference is relatively small and is only around 3-4 basis points. 
Overall, when the results are compared with those in the U.S. markets (George and Hwang, 
2007), we find no strong evidence in the UK market to support the January-April effect that is 
potentially linked with loser reversals caused by tax-loss selling at the tax year ends.   
When we look at control variables: momentum variables (52wkh Winner and 52wkh Losers), 
microstructure effects (Ri,t-1), and size, the 52 week high price captures short term momentum. 
For winners momentum the return is positive and 0.28% per month (column 1) while for losers it 
is negative and 0.48% per month in the first year ((1, 12) month holding period).  Consistent with 
the finding of George and Hwang (2004), momentum winners and losers do not reverse their 
returns in the long term. Our proxy to control for microstructure effects (Ri,t-1) is significantly 
and negatively correlated with monthly returns in every holding period. This highlights the need 
to control for a negative autocorrelation process between current and previous month return 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995).   
5.2 Tests of the value-growth hypothesis 
We use three firm ratios, BM, E/P, and CF/P as proxies for firm value-growth characteristics. 
We compare whether past performance such as winners and losers, or value-growth 
characteristics, can better explain long-term returns. We perform three pair-wise comparisons: (i) 
high and low BM ratio versus winners and losers, (ii) high and low E/P ratio versus winners and 
losers, and (iii) high and low CF/P ratio versus winners and losers. Table 3 report estimates
13
. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In Panel A, we compare returns between winners and losers and high and low BM ratio stocks. 
Consistent with the value-growth hypothesis, high and low BM stocks earn significantly positive 
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 Control variables are not reported for the brevity.  
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and negative returns, respectively. In the 5-year period (column 11), high BM stocks have a 
return of 0.37% per month while low BM stocks earn a return of -0.21% per month. Over a 5-
year period both 5-year winners and 5-year losers obtain insignificant returns (column 11 and 12). 
In each subinterval horizon, there are only two windows in which losers and winners have 
significant returns, for instance, 0.14% for losers in the window (37, 48) outside January and 
April and -0.12% for winners in the window (49, 60) outside January and April. These results 
contrast to winner-loser reversals in Table 2. The evidence suggests that BM ratio is better at 
capturing long-term returns than past performance measures.  
Panel B of Table 3 compares CF/P and past performance measures. High CF/P stocks have a 
significantly positive return of 0.35% per month (column 11) across a 5-year period.  However, 
low CF/P stocks have a significantly negative return of -0.51% only in the first year (column (1) 
and (2)) after portfolio formation. This result implies that CF/P has weaker predictive power than 
BM does.  Regarding past performance, we find that losers have an insignificant return of 0.07% 
per month over a 5-year period (column 11). In each subinterval, average returns for losers are 
insignificantly positive in seven out of ten sub-period windows. For winners, we can observe a 
negative return of -0.12% per month over a 5-year period. By introducing CF/P into the 
regressions, loser reversals have been substantially reduced but there is little effect on winner 
reversals. 
Panel C of Table 3 compares E/P and past performance measures. Value stocks measured by a 
high E/P ratio have large positive returns in the whole 5-year holding period and in the first four 
years (column 1 to 8). On average, they can earn 0.41% (column 11) per month relative to the 
risk-neutral portfolio over a 5-year period. In contrast, growth stocks with a low E/P ratio have a 
negative averaged return of -0.15% per month (column 11) over a 5-year period. These results 
are consistent with the value-growth hypothesis. For past performance based winners and losers, 
we find that losers’ returns become insignificantly different from zero over a 5-year period. The 
negative return of -0.10% for winners is weakly significant at a 10% level.  
In summary, value-growth characteristics captured by BM are better at predicting cross-section 
stock returns than CF/P and E/P over a long term. The comparison between value-growth and 
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past performance strategies shows that the long-term return pattern is better explained by firm 
specific characteristics than by past performance.       
5.3 Test of capital gain lock-in hypothesis 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
We compare past performance and the 5 year low measure in Panel A of Table 4. 5-year low 
winners have significantly negative returns in every window except in the first year (1, 12). Over 
the whole 5-year period, 5-year low winners have a negative return of -0.13% per month in all 
calendar months and -0.21% per month outside January and April. In contrast, past performance-
based winners have no significant returns across each window. This result suggests that capital 
gain winners completely dominate past winners to predict reversals. Furthermore, significant 
returns on past losers are only observed in windows including January and April, except column 
(4).  
Panel B in Table 4 reports results of EWGO and past performance measures. The results are very 
similar to 5-year low measures. EWGO winners have a significantly negative return of -0.09% 
per month over a 5-year period (in column 11) with a t-value 2.01 in all months and -0.15% 
outside January and April with a t-value 2.94. EWGO winners largely replace past winners to 
predict reversals. In summary, capital gain measures completely dominate past performance 
measures in predicting winner reversals in the cross-sectional comparison. These results give 
some support to the capital gain lock-in hypothesis.  
5.4 Risk-adjusted returns 
The purpose of this part of analysis is to see whether abnormal return can be maintained after 
risk adjustments. We regress time-series variables (e.g. tS5 ) on the Fama-French (1993) (FF) 
factors.  The intercepts in the regressions are risk-adjusted returns. The comparison between past 
performance and the specific BM ratio is reported in Table 5
14
, while Table 6 shows the 
comparison between past performance and embedded capital gain measures.  
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 Other pair-wise comparisons (e.g. CF/P against past performance, E/P against past performance) by using the 
market model, the two-factor model, and the three-factor model are also available upon request.  
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 [Insert Table 5 here] 
In Table 5, stocks with a high BM ratio earn a significant return of 0.14% per month in all 
calendar months (column 11). The size of this positive return is less than half of the abnormal 
return reported in Table 3 (0.37%). When excluding April and January in column (12), the return 
is 0.21% per month and 0.07% higher than the one in column 11, implying that the high BM 
portfolio has a negative return in January and April. This result indicates that value stocks are 
less likely to have the January-April effect. In each sub-period, value stocks identified by a high 
BM ratio have persistently strong positive returns except the window (48, 60) in columns (9) and 
(10). However, low BM stocks have no significant returns either in the window (1, 60) or in each 
sub-period.  Winners identified by past performance have a return of -0.08% per month during 
the 5-year period, while this negative return is only statistically significant at a 10% level. In 
contrast, losers have no significantly positive returns through column (1)-(12). The GRS test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the four portfolios have an equal return of zero across each 
observation window (column 1 to 12).  Overall, long-term reversals on past winners and losers 
largely disappear after we control for BM, while risk-adjusted abnormal returns on value stocks 
are likely to be maintained in the framework of Fama and French (1993).   
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
Panel A in Table 6 compares 5-year low and past performance measures. On a risk-adjusted 
basis, 5-year low winners have no significantly negative returns in any horizon. Over a 5-year 
period, 5-year low winners have an insignificantly positive return of 0.06% (column 11) per 
month. However, 5-year winners have a significantly negative return of -0.09% per month over a 
5-year period. The GRS test in column (7) and (8) with the null hypothesis that the four 
portfolios jointly have no significant alpha cannot be rejected at a 10% level.  The results in 
Panel B depict a same picture. While no significantly negative is found for EWGO winners, 5-
year winners have a significantly negative return -0.12% per month over a 5-year period.  The 
GRS test cannot reject the null hypothesis that returns all equal to zero in column (5)-(8) at a 5% 
level or higher. This means in the third and fourth year after portfolio formation, the four 
portfolios jointly have no abnormal returns. Overall, the results on the FF model show that 
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embedded capital gain measures lost most of their predictive power against past winners in 
predicting reversals. 
5.5 Robustness of risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
By using abnormal returns and risk-adjusted abnormal returns, we obtain two different pictures 
on the predicative power of capital gain measures. To investigate further on why capital gain 
measures lost most of their power in predicting winner reversals, we re-estimate risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns by using two additional models, namely the market model and the two-factor 
model, which includes size and the market factor.  
ifmiii eRRbaR  )(                                                                                                               (5) 
iifmiii eSMBsRRbaR  )(                                                                                                (6) 
iiifmiii eHMLhSMBsRRbaR  )(                                                                                 (7) 
iR is the averaged 60-month return, which we obtain from the Fama-MacBeth regression in each 
calendar month. mR is a market return. SMB and HML are size and value factor, respectively 
according to the definitions of Fama and French (1993; 1996) (FF). Table 7 reports the results. 
To save space, we only report risk-adjusted abnormal returns over the 60-month period including 
all calendar months.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 provides interesting results for why stocks with a large amount of capital gains 
experience negative returns. In the market model, both 5-year low winners and EWGO winners 
have significantly positive market loadings (column 1 Panel A and Panel B) (e.g. 0.1842 and 
0.1415), suggesting that the two portfolios have a higher market risk than the risk-neutral 
portfolio with a zero beta. Thus, their risk adjusted returns should not be higher than those 
calculated by the Fama-MacBeth model. In column (1), the two portfolios’ returns are nearly the 
same as those in Table 4 (-0.0012 against -0.0013; -0.0009 against -0.0009) with significance 
levels less than 10%. Similar results can be found in the two factor model with one additional 
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size factor (column (2)). However, when the value factor is incorporated into the model (column 
(3)), significantly negative abnormal returns on the two portfolio become disappeared.  This is 
because 5-year low and EWGO winners have a negative value loading of 0.3687 and 0.2932, 
respectively.  More importantly, each of the value loading exceeds the aggregated loadings of the 
size and market factor
15
. Thus, the risk-adjusted returns for the two portfolios in the FF model 
should be greater than those in Table 4. Consistent with this, the risk-adjusted returns on the two 
portfolios are both insignificantly different from zero (e.g. 0.0004 for 5-year low winners and 
0.0006 for EWGO winners). Negative value loadings indicate that stocks with large amounts of 
capital gains have a strong growth feature. Relative to value stocks, growth stocks are more 
likely to have positive earnings and to be highly priced, leading to a low book-to-market ratio 
(market-cap has increased). In addition, these capital gain winners are also small stocks with 
positive loadings on the size factor. The intuition behind this finding is that small stocks are 
more volatile and they may more easily accumulate capital gains than big stocks. Therefore, our 
results suggest that the growth feature is more likely a driving force of return reversals than 
capital gains. 
The GRS tests in Panel A and Panel B show that in terms of the market model (GRS test (i)) both 
capital gain portfolios and past performance portfolios have returns jointly insignificant from 
zero. However, in the FF model, the GRS tests (test (iii) in Panel A and B) reject the hypothesis 
that capital gain portfolios and past performance portfolios have joint zero returns. Column (9) 
reveals that 5-year winners have significantly negative returns after risk adjustments, implying 
that capital gain winners have no power over past performance winners to predict return 
reversals. In contrast with capital gain winners, the factor loadings imply that past performance 
winners are large, low market risk and value stocks. Finally, the adjusted 2R s in column (3) and 
(6) in Panel A and Panel B are larger than in other columns, implying that the FF model is better 
at capturing the return variations in capital gain portfolios. However, the FF model has relatively 
limited power to capture return variations of past performance based portfolios in column (9) and 
(12). Specifically, the adjusted 2R s of capital gain portfolios are greater than 30%, while those of 
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 For 5-year low winners, 0.3687 is greater than 0.3275 (0.2178+0.1097). For EWGO winners, 0.2932 is greater 
than 0.2389 (0.1635+0.0735). 
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past performance portfolios are only around 10% or less. In summary, significantly negative 
returns on capital gain winners in the cross-sectional analysis have been largely absorbed in the 
time-series based risk factors. Winners identified by capital gains have no significant risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates three competing explanations, past performance, value-growth 
characteristics, tax-motivated incentives, for long-term return reversals in the UK market by 
using 1673 stocks from 1974 to 2009. The first type of explanations is based on the predictive 
power of long-term past performance (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). The value-growth hypothesis 
claims that value-growth characteristics have strong power over past performance in predicting 
long-term returns. The capital gain lock-in hypothesis is built upon investor tax-avoidance 
motivations (Klein, 1999; George and Hwang, 2007) that winner reversals are due to investor 
great incentives to delay paying capital gain tax.   
We find that firm value-growth features generally provide better explanations for cross-sectional 
stock returns than past performance. Consistent with the value-growth hypothesis, the winner-
loser effect is largely diminished when we include firm characteristics proxied by BM, CF/F, and 
E/P.  Additionally, BM seems to be the most powerful predictor for long-term return among the 
three proxies. This result suggests that long-term stock return is more likely driven by firm 
fundamentals rather than by past performance. The interesting results emerge from the 
comparison between past performance and capital gain measures. In the cross-sectional analysis, 
we find that winners identified by embedded capital gains fully dominate past performance based 
winners in predicting return reversals. In the time-series analysis, the predictive power of capital 
winners cannot be fully explained away by using the market and the two-factor (market and size) 
model. However, the strong predictive power of capital gain winners becomes statistically 
insignificant in the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model. We find that stocks with a large 
amount of accumulated capital gains have a strong growth feature which dominates the 
aggregated size and market characteristics. Indeed, the growth feature is a driving force of return 
reversals rather than amounts of capital gains. Since growth stocks are more likely to experience 
positive earnings and, therefore, to be highly priced than value stocks, amounts of capital gains 
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are much easier to be accumulated in growth stocks.  Capital gain winners in prediction of return 
reversals in the cross-sectional analysis possibly capture market price corrections on growth 
stocks. Inconsistent with the capital gain lock-in hypothesis, amounts of embedded capital gains 
are less likely to drive long-term reversals in the UK market.    
Our study also provides further implications of long-term return reversals. First, we find weak 
evidence to support the over-reaction hypothesis, because firm specific characteristics largely 
replace the role played by past winners and losers in predicting long-term cross-sectional stock 
returns. Second, even though the empirical evidence in this paper is inconsistent with the capital 
gain lock-in hypothesis on a risk-adjusted basis, it does not fully rule out investors’ rational 
behaviour. If investors have a great incentive to delay paying tax gain taxes, growth stocks are 
more likely to be selected by investors and are more able to accumulate capital gains than value 
stocks.  Finally, the evidence of firm characteristics to predict returns may reflect a mixture of 
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Table 1 Correlation Matrix 










) in the top (bottom) 30% of  all stocks during past 60 months at month t. )52(52 ,, titi wkhLoserwkhWinner is the 52-week high winner (loser) 
dummy that takes the value one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t , and zero otherwise. The 52-week 
high measure in month t  is the ratio of the price level in month t to the maximum price achieved in months t-12 to t. Similar to the construction of the 52-
week high winner and loser dummies, 5-year low winner and loser dummies defined with respect to the 5-year low measure by using a 30% cutoff rate. 
tiEWGO , is the gain only, excluding losses, embedded in stock i  in month t  under the assumption that the stocks are acquired uniformly over the period 
from t-60 to t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to define EWGO winner and loser.  BM is the book to market ratio defined as book value equity (BV) divided by 
market value equity (MV). We record BM as a missing value if it is negative. CF/P is cash flow price ratio defined as operational cash flows divided by 
price. E/P is earning price ratio defined as earnings divided by price. The numerators of the three ratios, BV, CF, and E, are fiscal year ending values in the 
preceding calendar month t. The denominators of the three ratios, MV and P, are values in month  t. High (Low) BM is a dummy if a stock’s BM is in the 
top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month  t . Similar rules apply to other two firm specific variables (CF/P and E/P). Numbers reported in the table are time-
series averages of cross-sectional correlations.  
  

























5-y loser -0.29 1
52 wkh winner 0.11 -0.11 1
52 wkh loser -0.11 0.24 -0.30 1
EWGO winner 0.64 -0.01 0.09 0.27 1
EWGO loser -0.09 0.47 0.27 0.05 -0.11 1
5-y low winner 0.67 -0.01 0.13 -0.14 0.84 -0.12 1
5-y low loser -0.10 0.57 -0.10 0.25 -0.11 0.74 -0.12 1
High BM 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.24 1
Low BM 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.05 -0.10 1
High CF/P 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.08 1
Low CF/P 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.43 0.20 -0.10 1
High E/P 0.05 0.11 -0.08 0.16 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.27 0.13 0.06 0.41 -0.02 1




Table 2 5-year Winners and Losers 
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, )60...2,1(60 j cross-sectional regressions of the following form are estimated:          
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252  
itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the 
month 1t cross-sectional mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high 
measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in 









) in the top 
(bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j.  The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged over 12,...2,1j for column 
labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled (13,24), …, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). The numbers reported in the table are the time-series of 
averages of these averages in percent per month. Average observations for each calendar month based cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. The 
accompanying t-statistics are calculated from the time series.  
 











































Intercept 1.06 0.78 0.95 0.66 0.98 0.64 0.97 0.63 1.18 0.76 1.18 0.67
(4.83) (3.98) (4.36) (3.53) (4.35) (3.48) (5.30) (3.42) (4.42) (3.55) (4.45) (3.59)
Ri,t-1 -2.54 -3.41 -2.82 -3.72 -2.87 -3.78 -2.95 -3.85 -2.94 -3.83 -2.82 -3.72
(-2.47) (-3.75) (-2.92) (-4.16) (-3.01) (-4.22) (-3.14) (-4.33) (-3.14) (-4.31) (-2.94) (-4.16)
Sizei, t-1 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01
(-1.68) (-0.85) (-0.29) (0.44) (-0.21) (0.62) (-0.26) (0.66) (-0.28) (0.68) (-0.48) (0.32)
52wkh Winner 0.28 0.37 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.12
(3.09) (3.68) (1.09) (2.28) (0.17) (1.48) (0.08) (0.88) (0.02) (0.50) (1.96) (3.21)
52wkh Loser -0.48 -0.57 -0.06 -0.18 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.24
(-4.08) (-5.66) (-1.01) (-2.71) (-0.66) (-2.04) (0.13) (-0.62) (0.42) (-0.02) (-3.56) (-5.47)
5-year Winner -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10
(-1.54) (-0.71) (-1.75) (-2.08) (-1.49) (-1.92) (-1.06) (-1.74) (-1.78) (-2.48) (-1.94) (-2.27)
5-year Loser 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.12
(2.02) (0.83) (2.66) (1.81) (2.42) (2.02) (2.04) (2.00) (0.30) (0.19) (2.29) (1.93)




Table 3 Value-Growth Variables versus Past Performance Measures  
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for )60...2,1(60 j times. itR is the return to 
stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum 









) in the top (bottom) 30% of  all stocks during 
past 60 months at month t-j.  BM is the book to market ratio defined as book value equity (BV) divided by market value equity (MV). Following Fama and French 
(2006), we record BM as a missing value if it is negative. CF/P is cash flow price ratio defined as operational cash flows divided by price. E/P is earning price ratio 
defined as earnings divided by price. The numerators of the three ratios, BV, CF, and E, are fiscal year ending values in the preceding calendar month t-j. The 
denominators of the three ratios, MV and P, are values in month t-j. High BM (Low BM) is a dummy variable if stock i ’s BM is in the top (bottom) 30% of all 
stocks in month t-j. The same 30% cutoff rate is applied to high (low) CF/P, and high (low E/P).  The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are 
averaged over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled (13,24), …, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). Coefficients on 
control variables are omitted for brevity. The numbers reported in the table are the time-series of averages of these averages in percent per month. Average 
observations for each calendar month based cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. The accompanying t-statistics are calculated from the time series.  
 











































high BM 0.51 0.57 0.40 0.47 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.40 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.43
(7.67) (7.86) (5.88) (6.35) (4.97) (5.71) (4.71) (5.31) (3.33) (4.02) (5.84) (6.43)
low BM -0.36 -0.37 -0.26 -0.27 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 -0.21 -0.22
(-4.20) (-3.94) (-3.43) (-3.35) (-2.16) (-1.99) (-2.25) (-2.18) (-1.91) (-1.95) (-3.29) (-3.19)
5-year Winner -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07
(-0.56) (0.13) (-1.25) (-1.01) (-1.64) (-1.52) (-0.89) (-1.06) (-1.45) (-1.90) (-1.45) (-1.36)
5-year Loser 0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.06
(0.51) (-0.59) (1.31) (0.74) (1.72) (1.50) (1.73) (1.79) (0.35) (0.32) (1.34) (0.88)
Avg.obs 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 858
Panel A




high CF/P 0.89 0.88 0.42 0.42 0.21 0.24 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.35 0.36
(8.68) (8.90) (6.26) (5.87) (3.04) (3.37) (1.84) (2.04) (1.76) (1.51) (5.96) (5.72)
low CF/P -0.51 -0.54 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.12 -0.06 -0.05
(-5.64) (-5.29) (-0.47) (-0.33) (0.75) (0.94) (1.38) (1.59) (1.33) (1.50) (-0.85) (-0.58)
5-year Winner -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.12 -0.11
(-0.86) (-0.54) (-1.23) (-1.36) (-1.98) (-2.11) (-1.17) (-1.51) (-2.20) (-2.74) (-2.55) (-2.10)
5-year Loser -0.09 -0.17 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05
(-1.04) (-1.82) (1.08) (0.56) (1.77) (1.53) (2.00) (2.18) (0.71) (0.77) (1.22) (0.73)
Avg.obs 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830
high E/P 0.90 0.91 0.48 0.50 0.24 0.29 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.43
(9.39) (9.14) (5.99) (5.75) (3.02) (3.32) (1.90) (2.01) (1.56) (1.30) (5.55) (5.49)
low E/P -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.18 -0.18 -0.23 -0.18 -0.22 -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14
(-1.28) (-0.29) (-1.62) (-2.60) (-2.94) (-3.54) (-2.74) (-3.05) (1.13) (-1.42) (-2.03) (-2.46)
5-year Winner -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10
(-0.65) (-0.28) (-1.37) (-1.41) (-2.23) (-2.31) (-1.37) (-1.70) (-2.12) (-2.65) (-1.67) (-1.81)
5-year Loser -0.06 -0.13 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
(-0.68) (-1.44) (1.27) (0.75) (1.90) (1.63) (2.17) (2.31) (0.81) (0.86) (1.06) (0.95)
Avg.obs 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820
Panel B
Panel C
Table 3 continued 
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit ePLCFbPHCFbyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,8,7,6,5,4,31,21,10 //555252




Table 4 Capital Gain and Past Performance Measures 
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for )60...2,1(60 j times. itR is the return to 
stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum 









) in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during 
past 60 months at month t-j. Similar to the construction of the 52-week high winner and loser dummies, 5-year low winner and loser dummies defined with respect 
to the 5-year low measure by using a 30% cutoff rate. tiEWGO , is the gain only, excluding losses, embedded in stock i  in month t  under the assumption that the 
stocks are acquired uniformly over the period from t-60 to t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to define EWGO winner and loser. EWGO winner is a dummy variable and 
equals one if stock i ’s EWGO is in the top 30% of all stocks in month  jt  , and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are 
averaged over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled (13, 24), …, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). Coefficients on 
control variables are omitted for brevity. The numbers reported in the table are the time-series of averages of these averages in percent per month. Average 
observations for each calendar month based cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. The accompanying t-statistics are calculated from the time series.  









































5y low winner -0.07 -0.13 -0.21 -0.25 -0.19 -0.25 -0.19 -0.26 -0.07 -0.14 -0.13 -0.21
(-0.97) (-1.64) (-3.03) (-3.24) (-3.09) (-3.57) (-3.03) (-3.82) (-1.08) (-2.10) (-2.57) (-3.64)
5y low loser -0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05
(-0.48) (-0.96) (0.47) (0.25) (2.07) (1.89) (1.50) (1.59) (0.68) (1.12) (1.04) (1.01)
5-year Winner -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.03
(-0.35) (0.79) (0.40) (0.66) (0.37) (0.72) (1.11) (1.15) (-1.09) (-0.76) (0.24) (0.74)
5-year Loser 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.05
(1.83) (0.78) (2.38) (1.70) (1.59) (1.18) (0.97) (1.04) (-0.85) (-1.12) (1.63) (1.00)
Avg.obs 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736
Panel A





EWGO winner -0.03 -0.07 -0.21 -0.26 -0.12 -0.18 -0.07 -0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15
(-0.43) (-0.97) (-3.24) (-3.65) (-1.99) (-2.60) (-1.21) (-2.28) (-0.40) (-1.21) (-2.01) (-2.94)
EWGO loser 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.26) (0.15) (0.24) (-0.09) (2.35) (2.07) (2.30) (2.05) (0.91) (1.23) (1.54) (1.36)
5-year Winner -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.00
(-0.85) (0.20) (0.67) (0.70) (0.28) (0.32) (0.26) (0.20) (-1.06) (-1.14) (-0.16) (0.09)
5-year Loser 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.06
(1.82) (0.69) (2.39) (1.72) (1.79) (1.44) (0.99) (1.18) (-0.57) (-0.75) (1.70) (1.13)
Avg.obs 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796
Panel B
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eEWGOLoserbEWGOWinnerbyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,8,7,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252
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Table 5 The Fama and French three-factor based Risk-Adjusted Returns for BM and 5-year Winner and Loser 
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for )60...2,1(60 j times.  
 
itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the 
month 1t cross-sectional mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high 
measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level 









) in the top 
(bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j. Similar to the construction of the 52-week high winner and loser dummies, 5-year low winner and 
loser dummies defined with respect to the 5-year low measure by using a 30% cutoff rate. tiEWGO ,  is the gain only, excluding losses, embedded in stock i  in 
month t  under the assumption that the stocks are acquired uniformly over the period from t-60 to t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to define EWGO winner and loser. 
For example, EWGO winner is a dummy variable and equals one if stock i ’s EWGO is in the top 30% of all stocks in month  jt  , and zero otherwise. To obtain 
risk-adjusted returns, we further run times-series of averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regression, on the Fama-
French (1996) three-factor model. The numbers reported for risk-adjusted returns are intercepts from these time-series regressions. They are percent per month 
and their t-statistics are in parentheses. GRS test is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the intercepts in the regressions for four portfolios are jointly equal to 
zero. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity. 











































High BM 0.28 0.35 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.21
(5.19) (5.78) (2.63) (3.46) (2.08) (3.06) (2.08) (2.82) (0.60) (1.44) (2.84) (3.81)
Low BM 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
(0.07) (-0.02) (0.45) (-0.10) (1.21) (1.17) (0.46) (0.31) (0.29) (0.60) (0.63) (0.42)
5-year winner 0.06 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08
(0.60) (1.26) (-1.21) (-0.99) (-2.00) (-2.20) (-1.80) (-1.67) (-1.86) (-1.90) (-1.60) (-1.62)
5-year loser -0.14 -0.10 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12
(-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.85) (-1.69) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.24) (-0.19) (-1.49) (-1.73) (-1.54) (-1.60)
obs 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306
GRS Test 13.26 16.49 2.90 5.20 3.39 4.52 3.15 4.38 4.25 6.21 4.15 6.18
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eLBMbHBMbyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,8,7,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252
35 
 
Table 6 The Fama and French three-factor based Risk-Adjusted Returns for capital gain and 5-year performance measures 
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for )60...2,1(60 j times. itR is the return 
to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-
sectional mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock 
i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to 









) in the top (bottom) 30% of all 
stocks during past 60 months at month t-j. Similar to the construction of the 52-week high winner and loser dummies, 5-year low winner and loser dummies 
defined with respect to the 5-year low measure by using a 30% cutoff rate. tiEWGO , is the gain only, excluding losses, embedded in stock i  in month t  under the 
assumption that the stocks are acquired uniformly over the period from t-60 to t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to define EWGO winner and loser. For example, 
EWGO winner is a dummy variable and equals one if stock i ’s EWGO is in the top 30% of all stocks in month  jt  , and zero otherwise. To obtain risk-adjusted 
returns, we further run times-series of averages, which are computed from the cross-sectional regression, on the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model. The 
numbers reported for risk-adjusted returns are intercepts from these time-series regressions. They are percent per month and their t-statistics are in parentheses. 
GRS test is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the intercepts in the regressions for the four portfolios are jointly equal to zero. Coefficients on control 
variables are omitted for brevity. 
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5y low winner 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04
(3.45) (2.62) (0.56) (0.50) (-0.21) (-0.70) (-0.37) (-0.64) (0.76) (0.43) (1.24) (0.64)
5y low loser -0.22 -0.30 -0.18 -0.22 -0.11 -0.15 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.17
(-3.20) (-3.87) (-3.20) (-3.59) (-1.95) (-2.34) (-1.00) (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.59) (-3.24) (-3.87)
5-year Winner -0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
(-2.28) (-1.14) (-0.94) (-0.77) (-1.13) (-0.51) (-0.88) (-0.96) (-2.38) (-2.70) (-2.21) (-1.79)
5-year Loser -0.05 -0.10 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.00
(-0.67) (-1.31) (0.96) (0.55) (1.13) (1.03) (0.78) (1.02) (-0.90) (-0.94) (0.37) (0.11)
GRS  Test 6.24 7.51 3.74 4.44 2.12 2.75 1.01 1.89 2.59 3.48 4.35 6.00
p -value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.39 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
obs 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306
EWGO winner 0.25 0.23 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
(3.87) (3.20) (0.28) (0.09) (-0.34) (-0.87) (0.03) (-0.34) (0.78) (0.59) (1.42) (0.78)
EWGO loser -0.16 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15
(-2.54) (-2.89) (-3.02) (-3.49) (-1.80) (-2.15) (-0.93) (-1.43) (-1.71) (-1.86) (-2.62) (-3.10)
5-year Winner -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 -0.20 -0.25 -0.12 -0.12
(-2.37) (-1.46) (-1.15) (-0.97) (-1.54) (-1.03) (-1.87) (-1.97) (-3.13) (-3.73) (-2.81) (-2.58)
5-year Loser -0.10 -0.17 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 -0.07
(-1.21) (-2.01) (0.00) (-0.51) (0.44) (0.18) (0.09) (0.05) (-1.53) (-1.70) (-0.58) (-0.99)
GRS  Test 6.05 6.54 3.19 4.29 1.84 2.41 1.45 2.41 3.81 5.44 3.52 3.79
p -value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
obs 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306
Panel A
Panel B
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eylowLoserbylowWinnerbyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,8,7,6,5,4,31,21,10 55555252




Table 7 The market and the two-factor based risk-Adjusted returns for capital gain and 5-year performance measures 
Each month between June 1979 and December 2009, we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for )60...2,1(60 j times. itR is the return 
to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-
sectional mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock 
i is ranked in the top (bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to 









) in the top (bottom) 30% of  all 
stocks during past 60 months at month t-j. Similar to the construction of the 52-week high winner and loser dummies, 5-year low winner and loser dummies 
defined with respect to the 5-year low measure by using a 30% cutoff rate. tiEWGO ,  is the gain only, excluding losses, embedded in stock i  in month t  under 
the assumption that the stocks are acquired uniformly over the period from t-60 to t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to define EWGO winner and loser. For example, 
EWGO winner is a dummy variable and equals one if stock i ’s EWGO is in the top 30% of all stocks in month  jt  , and zero otherwise. To obtain risk-adjusted 
returns, we further run times-series of averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regression, on the Fama-French (1996) 
three-factor model ( iiifmiii eHMLhSMBsRRbaR  )( ), the market model ( ifmiii eRRbaR  )( ), and the two-factor model 
( iifmiii eSMBsRRbaR  )( ). iR is the averaged 60-month raw return in excess of risk-free rate, which we obtain from the Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
mR is a market return. SMB and HML are size and value factor respectively according to the definition of Fama and French (1996). The estimates are computed 
on the 60-month holding period by including all calendar months. The numbers reported for risk-adjusted returns are intercepts from these time-series regressions 
and their t-statistics are in parentheses. GRS test is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the intercepts in the regressions for four portfolios are jointly equal to 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
GRS-Test
a -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
(-2.43) (-2.33) (0.64) (0.04) (-0.15) (-3.24) (-0.56) (-0.70) (-2.21) (1.68) (1.38) (0.37) (i) 0.05
b 0.1828 0.2408 0.2178 -0.1777 -0.2266 -0.2098 -0.1027 -0.1329 -0.1242 0.0318 0.0490 0.0560 p-value=0.99
(7.37) (9.29) (9.53) (-8.42) (-10.26) (-10.36) (-5.16) (-6.45) (-5.94) (1.30) (1.85) (2.13) (ii) 3.67
s 0.1368 0.1097 -0.1152 -0.0954 -0.0712 -0.0609 0.0406 0.0484 p-value=0.01
(5.66) (5.13) (-5.59) (-5.04) (-3.58) (-3.12) (1.64) (1.96) 4.35
h -0.3687 0.2700 0.1399 0.1061 (iii) p-value=0.00
(-10.42) (8.63) (4.33) (2.60)
Adj-Rsq 0.13 0.20 0.38 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01
obs 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366
GRS-Test
a -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 -0.12 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0012 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0003
(-1.81) (-1.73) (1.42) (0.41) (0.44) (-2.62) (-0.99) (-1.15) (-2.81) (1.64) (1.58) (-0.58) (i) 0.03
b 0.1407 0.1818 0.1635 -0.1627 -0.2285 -0.2100 -0.0775 -0.1134 -0.1032 -0.0053 -0.0043 0.0090 p-value=0.99
(6.43) (7.83) (7.74) (-2.89) (-9.42) (-9.45) (-4.99) (-4.99) (-4.65) (-0.20) (-0.15) (0.30) (ii) 2.29
s 0.0969 0.0754 -0.1550 -0.1333 -0.0848 -0.0727 0.0023 0.0181 p-value=0.06
(4.48) (3.82) (-6.86) (-6.41) (-4.00) (-3.51) (0.09) (0.67) 2.60
h -0.2932 0.2958 0.1641 0.2143 (iii) p-value=0.03
(-8.97) (8.61) (4.78) (4.81)
Adj-Rsq 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.05
obs 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 366
EWGO winner EWGO loser 5-year winner 5-year loser
Panel A
5-year low winner 5-year low loser 5-year winner 5-year loser
Panel B
 
